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PROPERTY LAW—UPENDING THE FAMILIAR TOOLS OF ESTATE
PLANNING: EQUITY RENDERS REVOCABLE TRUSTS SUBJECT TO THE
ARKANSAS SPOUSAL ELECTION. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237,
434 S.W.3d 877.
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2014, the Supreme Court of Arkansas issued a decision
that will “upend the use of familiar tools of estate planning” when it held
that a revocable trust can be used to calculate a spousal elective share under
certain circumstances.1 The decision, In re Estate of Thompson, grappled
with the clashing of two fundamental policies: free alienation and spousal
protection via the elective share.
After Anne married Ripley Thompson in 2001, she left her career as a
nurse because Ripley promised to provide for her.2 In 2002, Ripley created a
trust that would come to be valued at almost $6,000,000 and designated
Anne as a co-trustee and beneficiary.3 Ripley was the grantor and the trustee, and he retained the power to revoke or amend the trust during his lifetime.4 After about seven years of marriage, the health of Ripley and Anne
declined, and the two became somewhat estranged.5 Anne eventually filed
for separate maintenance, and, less than a year before Ripley died, he
amended the trust so that Anne received $100,000 outright, about 1.6% of
the trust’s value, on the condition that she not contest its provisions.6 He also
revoked her status as co-trustee, and he did not inform her of any of these
changes.7
Despite the no-contest clause, Anne filed suit after Ripley passed and
she learned of her disinheritance; she claimed the circumstances behind her
disinheritance amounted to fraud and her elective share should be calculated
by including the trust assets, an approach that has never been followed in
Arkansas.8

1. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 18, 22, 434 S.W.3d 877, 887, 889.
2. Id. at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879.
3. Id. at 3, 13, 434 S.W.3d at 879, 884. The provisions of the trust gave the spouse
income for life, annual withdrawal rights of $5,000 or 5% of the principal, and the right to
invade the principal for extraordinary expenses. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879, 884.
4. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880.
5. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885.
6. Id. at 13, 434 S.W.3d at 884.
7. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885.
8. Id. at 3, 434 S.W.3d at 879.
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Arkansas agreed with Anne and, in
doing so, set precedent.9 It invalidated Ripley’s revocable inter vivos trust
for the narrow purpose of crediting it toward the spousal elective share due
to a finding of fraudulent intent.10 The court articulated the fraud as an “improper circumvention of the marital rights of the surviving spouse,”11 but
knowing what this standard entails will be difficult going forward. Although
the court highlighted several factors relied on in establishing fraudulent intent, it also provided that “each case must be determined on its own facts
and circumstances.”12
Thompson has launched Arkansas probate law into a gray zone of uncertainty. Before, nonprobate transfers were simply not subject to the elective share. Now, nonprobate transfers may be subject to the elective share if
the court thinks it reasonable to do so under the totality of the circumstances. Although the Thompson court articulates an intent-based test and applies
the holding narrowly to revocable trusts, the decision was actually made on
the equities of the case. In these cases, “fraudulent intent” is simply a posthoc label assigned to an equitable outcome. The factors used are primarily
objective, and a synthesis of case law from the jurisdictions cited in Thompson sheds significant light on what sorts of circumstances may lead the court
to a finding of fraudulent intent.
Part II of this note will begin by discussing nonprobate transfers,13 the
history of the spousal elective share,14 and efforts to protect against spousal
disinheritance that occurs as a result of nonprobate transfers;15 it will end
with a discussion of Arkansas’s approach to the problem debuted in Thompson.16 Part III will provide an in-depth analysis of factors used in other jurisdictions to determine whether a nonprobate transfer is subject to the spousal
elective share.17 Although this section will provide some guidance, it will
also demonstrate just how malleable the Thompson court’s intent-based
analysis is and how unpredictable Arkansas’s estate planning realm is left as
a result. Part III will end by offering a practical solution in the form of nuptial agreements,18 and Part IV will conclude the note.

9. See id. at 18, 434 S.W.3d at 887 (explaining that the court has designated an intentbased test, but has never applied it to facts giving rise to a finding of fraud, and
“[a]ccordingly, that is the area of law for this court to develop in this case”).
10. Id. at 19, 434 S.W.3d at 887.
11. Id. at 17, 434 S.W.3d at 886.
12. Id. at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.B.1.
15. See infra Part II.B.2.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part III.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Nonprobate Transfers
Although the probate system is indispensable, it is not a system that
everyone needs to use, and, today, it is a system that is becoming disfavored
relative to nonprobate transfers.19 Four main will substitutes comprise the
nonprobate system: life insurance, pension accounts, joint accounts, and
revocable trusts.20 Each is the functional equivalent of a will in that it reserves lifetime control to the owner.21
Life insurance is the functional equivalent of a will because generally it
is revocable until the death of the testator, and the interests of the beneficiaries are nonexistent until the testator’s death.22 Pension accounts, such as
individual retirement accounts, also pass any remaining interest to the beneficiary when the owner dies.23 Although joint accounts differ from wills theoretically because the donee receives a present interest equal to that of the
donor, in practice, they can be manipulated to achieve the same result because a donor need not inform a co-tenant of the assets and may treat the
account as his or her own; so, effectively, the transfer is revocable.24
Similarly, for revocable trusts, the type of will substitute at issue in
Thompson, the transferor generally names himself as trustee for the beneficiary but retains lifetime control and the power to revoke.25 The remainder
interest given to the beneficiary is functionally the same as the mere expectancy conveyed through a will in that it is revocable.26 Because the settlor is
divested of all ownership at death, and because the Arkansas elective share
statute limits a surviving spouse to property in the settlor’s probate estate
after death, revocable trusts have not traditionally been subject to the elective share.27 Revocable trusts are widely used as the central document of an
estate plan28 and have consistently increased in popularity; as their numbers
19. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984) (stating that the law of wills and rules of descent
no longer govern most succession of property).
20. Id. at 1109.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1110.
23. Id. at 1111.
24. Id. at 1112.
25. Langbein, supra note 19, at 1113.
26. Id.
27. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 9, 434 S.W.3d 877, 882 (“As noted,
Arkansas law is well settled that the surviving spouse’s elective interest can vest only in
property that the deceased spouse owned at the time of death.”).
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: VALIDITY & EFFECT OF REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS
TRUST § 25 (2003). Revocable trusts are authorized in every state, by either statute or com-
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have continued to increase, so has litigation over their consequences, one of
which is spousal disinheritance.29
B.

The Spousal Elective Share
1.

The Traditional Elective Share

The spousal elective share originated in common law dower and
curtesy; it had the same purpose then as it has now—to protect against disinheritance when one spouse predeceases another.30 At its inception, it protected only an interest in a life estate, but the elective share has expanded
over time to afford greater protection to surviving spouses.31 Eventually, it
expanded to give an outright interest in real property,32 and, as wealth accumulation shifted from real to personal property, it expanded to include personal property.33 Today, the policy behind the spousal elective share presents the most significant limitation on the right to free alienation.34
As the predominant method of wealth transmission shifted from probate to nonprobate transfers, many jurisdictions began recognizing that the
traditional elective share provided inadequate protection against disinheritance.35 Because the elective share was calculated from the probate estate,
people could easily disinherit their spouses by putting the majority of their
assets into a trust, which would become irrevocable upon death of the transferor.36 A variety of efforts aimed at preventing spousal disinheritance developed in response, and, today, only a minority of jurisdictions follows the
traditional elective share approach.37 The traditional approach calculates the

mon law. Isabelle V. Taylor, Creditor Rights and the Missing Link in the Arkansas Trust
Code: Is Death Strong Enough “to Break the Chain?”, 65 ARK. L. REV. 433, 434 (2012).
29. Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 191, 240 (2005).
30. Susan N. Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate
Tax Law Provides a Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 575 (1995); Angela M. Vallario,
Spousal Election: Suggested Equitable Reform for the Division of Property at Death, 52
CATH. U.L. REV. 519, 526–27 (2003).
31. Vallario, supra note 30, at 526.
32. Id.
33. Colby T. Roe, Comment, Arkansas Marriage: A Partnership Between a Husband
and Wife, or a Safety Net for Support?, 61 ARK. L. REV. 735, 737–38 (2009).
34. See id. at 737.
35. Vallario, supra note 30, at 521; see also RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL T.
FLANNERY, DECEDENTS’ ESTATES 430–31 (2d ed. 2011).
36. Gary, supra note 30, at 576.
37. Vallario, supra note 30, at 535.
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elective share according to a fixed percentage of the decedent’s net estate,
which does not include nonprobate assets such as trusts.38
2.

Augmenting the Elective Share: A Modern Trend

Broadly speaking, efforts to protect against disinheritance took the
form of judicial decisions to allow the elective share to reach nonprobate
transfers in certain inequitable circumstances and statutes that expressly
make nonprobate transfers subject to the elective share. Common law efforts
at preventing spousal disinheritance via nonprobate transfers preceded statutory attempts at achieving the same.39 Court decisions in jurisdictions attempting to protect spouses revolve around control, intent, or both.40 Decisions allowing the elective share to reach nonprobate transfers under circumstances where it seems equitable to do so comprise a modern trend.41
The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was the original source of the augmented elective share in statutory form; its purposes were to prevent spousal
disinheritance via nonprobate transfers42 and to increase predictability in
terms of property division at death.43 Augmented elective share statutes generally accomplish this by adding to a decedent’s estate all transfers that the
decedent made over which he maintained dominion and control during life.44
Today, a majority of jurisdictions has implemented augmented elective
share statutes to more adequately protect spouses against disinheritance.45
Similarly to other minority states,46 the Arkansas General Assembly
has declined to adopt the UPC’s augmented estate model on several occa38. Angela Vallario & Phyllis A. Book, Shocked by Schoukroun! Elective Share Statute
Needs to Be Fixed, MD. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 40; Vallario, supra note 30, at 535.
39. Compare Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d 966, 968 (N.Y. 1937) (citing to other cases
dealing with the same issue dating back to 1842, for example), with Alan Newman, Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage into Elective-Share Law: The Approximation
System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property Alternative, 49
EMORY L.J. 487, 487 n.1 (2000) (stating that the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was first
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American
Bar Association in 1969).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.1 (2003); Roe,
supra note 33, at 755–57; J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Validity of Inter Vivos Trust Established
by One Spouse Which Impairs the Other Spouse’s Distributive Share or Other Statutory
Rights in Property, 39 A.L.R.3d 14 (1971).
41. See Langbein, supra note 19, at 1132 (“Modern practice supplies only one theory
that can reconcile wills and will substitutes in a workable and honest manner: the rule of
transferor’s intent.”).
42. Newman, supra note 39, at 496 n.38; Roe, supra note 33, at 747.
43. Vallario, supra note 30, at 544–45.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. E.g., Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1159 n.15 (Md. 2008).

80

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

sions.47 After Thompson, however, equity can still avoid the effect of a
nonprobate transfer used to disinherit one’s spouse in Arkansas.48
C.

Arkansas Joins the Modern Trend

Arkansas has not adopted the UPC’s concept of an augmented elective
share statute,49 which would put the nonprobate transfers within the reach of
the elective share, but Arkansas has adopted the Uniform Trust Code (the
“Arkansas Trust Code”), which expressly states that it is supplemented by
the common law of trusts and principles of equity.50 The Arkansas Trust
Code codifies the common law rules that trusts may not be contrary to public policy and may not be induced by fraud.51
Though the Arkansas Trust Code was adopted as a set of default rules
to use, subordinate largely to the settlor’s intent,52 it explicitly states that the
“terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this chapter except the requirement that the trust have a purpose that is lawful and not contrary to
public policy and the power of a court to take such action as may be necessary in the interests of justice.”53 This language carves out an exception for
cases like Thompson to subject nonprobate transfers to the elective share.
1. Thompson’s Foundation
Several Arkansas cases helped lay a foundation for the court’s holding
in Thompson, but two in particular advocated the use of an intent-based test
in cases of spousal disinheritance. In the context of a widower with six children who deeded land to his children just before marrying his second wife,
West v. West provided that “if a man or woman convey away his or her
47. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 21, 434 S.W.3d 877, 889; see Foster,
supra note 29, at 192–93, 201.
48. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 6, 19, 434 S.W.3d at 880, 887 (stating that “the construction, interpretation, and operation of trusts are matters within the jurisdiction of the
courts of equity” and holding “that when a settlor creates an inter vivos revocable trust with
the intent to deprive his or her surviving spouse of marital rights to property, then the trust
assets will be included in the settlor’s probate estate for the limited purpose of calculating the
elective share”).
49. Phillip Carroll, Uniform Laws in Arkansas, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 313, 346–47 (1999). The
bill introducing the UPC failed the Arkansas General Assembly in 1995 and again in 1997.
Id.
50. Foster, supra note 29, at 192–93, 201.
51. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-404, -406 (Repl. 2012) (stating respectively that “[a] trust
may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and
possible to achieve” and “[a] trust is void to the extent its creation was induced by fraud,
duress, or undue influence”).
52. Foster, supra note 29, at 200.
53. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-105(b)(3), -105(b)(10) (Repl. 2012).
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property for the purpose of depriving the intended husband or wife of the
legal rights and benefits arising from such marriage, equity will avoid such
conveyance” and “fraud is never presumed.”54
Later, in Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., the intent-based test
was revived in the specific context of a revocable trust.55 The settlor retained
the power to revoke and income for life in a trust created two years prior to
death, but the court held this was not a fraudulent scheme.56 Because the
decedent left his spouse a life estate in his home and about $300 per month,
and this amount was not wildly disproportionate to his total assets, the court
did not find fraudulent intent.57 In choosing an intent-based test, the Richards court relied on decisions from Missouri, Tennessee, Illinois, and Wisconsin.58
Several other Arkansas cases highlighted the general idea that the elective share is an exceedingly important interest that demands substantial protection. Hamilton v. Hamilton asserted that the elective share is designed to
strike a balance between free alienation and protecting a surviving spouse
and confirmed that “the surviving spouse’s right to an elective share is inviolate” even if it disrupts the settlor’s intent.59 Estate of Dahlmann v. Estate
of Dahlmann established that one has the right to exclude a surviving spouse
from his or her inheritance subject to the statutory elective share, which prevents injustice.60
As important as the elective share is in Arkansas case law, it is not always paramount. Gregory v. Estate of Gregory confirmed that the right to
an elective share is “firmly entrenched public policy.”61 However, in the
context of an irrevocable trust in which the settlor had relinquished control
entirely, the settlor had no right to revoke when the trust provided for his
children and he had left a life estate in his home to the second wife.62 The
rights of the settlor’s six children were favored despite some effect of
spousal disinheritance.63

54. West v. West, 120 Ark. 500, 504, 179 S.W. 1017, 1018 (1915).
55. Richards v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 261 Ark. 890, 894, 552 S.W.2d 228, 230
(1977) (“The important consideration is the settlor’s intent.”).
56. Id., 552 S.W.2d at 230.
57. Id. at 892, 894, 552 S.W.2d at 230–31.
58. Id. at 894, 552 S.W.2d at 230.
59. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 578, 879 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1994).
60. Estate of Dahlmann v. Estate of Dahlmann, 282 Ark. 296, 298, 668 S.W.2d 520, 521
(1984).
61. Gregory v. Estate of Gregory, 315 Ark. 187, 191, 866 S.W.2d 379, 382 (1993).
62. Id., 866 S.W.2d at 381–82.
63. Id. at 188, 866 S.W.2d at 380.
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In re Estate of Thompson

The Supreme Court of Arkansas set precedent and joined the modern
trend in Thompson by affirming the circuit court and holding that “when a
settlor creates an inter vivos revocable trust with the intent to deprive his or
her surviving spouse of marital rights to property, then the trust assets will
be included in the settlor’s probate estate for the limited purpose of calculating the elective share.”64 In doing so, the high court left the circuit court’s
factual findings regarding the settlor’s intent to deprive undisturbed.65 Because the rule adopted in Thompson requires a very fact-oriented analysis,
these facts are important.66
a. The facts
The appellee-widow, Anne, was married to the settlor-decedent, Ripley, from July 15, 2001 until his death on February 20, 2010.67 Their almost
nine years of marriage produced no children, and Ripley had no children
from a previous marriage.68 According to Anne, she quit her successful career as a nurse at her husband’s request because he promised to provide for
her.69
In 2002, after about one year of marriage, Ripley created the H. Ripley
Thompson Revocable Trust to which he transferred substantial assets, and
he, as grantor and trustee, retained the power to amend or revoke the trust
during his lifetime.70 Subsequent to its creation, Ripley would amend his
trust twice, once in 2004 and again in 2009, less than one year before his
death.71 The 2004 trust amendment provided Anne with the right to invade
the principal for extraordinary expenses, the right to annual withdrawals of
$5,000 or 5% of its net fair-market value of the principal on the date of
withdrawal, and income for life from the trust’s net income.72 The 2009
trust, however, significantly curtailed Anne’s assets and status: it limited her
64. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 19, 434 S.W.3d 877, 887.
65. Id. at 1, 15, 434 S.W.3d at 878, 885 (stating that the circuit court’s findings were not
clearly erroneous).
66. Id. at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884 (asserting that “the settlor’s intent should be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis considering all relevant facts and circumstances”).
67. Id. at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879.
68. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879.
69. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879.
70. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 879–80 (explaining that the settlor
signed a bill of sale transferring investment accounts and stocks including 409.09 shares of
his family-owned business common stock from his own name to the trust, indicating that he
owned the stock).
71. Id. at 2, 14, 434 S.W.3d at 879, 885.
72. Id. at 13, 434 S.W.3d at 884.
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to an amount of $100,000, conditional upon her not contesting the trust, and
revoked her status as co-trustee entirely, naming instead Ripley’s nephew,
the appellant.73 Compared to Ripley’s trust valued at $6,000,000, the circuit
court found that $100,000 “falls woefully short of providing for his wife
upon his death.”74
The circuit court found that the husband’s intent to deprive his wife of
her marital rights arose sometime in 2008 when they separated.75 Anne and
Ripley discontinued living together in 2008 as a result of a mold infestation
in their home; Ripley went to another home in McCrory, and Anne went to
Memphis to sell some real property she owned.76 While she was away, Anne
suffered a stroke, and Ripley, whose health was declining as a result of heart
disease, diabetes, and dementia, was taken to a nursing home by his nephew.77 Ripley executed the 2009 trust amendment while he was in the nursing
home and remained there until death.78 Sometime during the separation,
Anne had filed for separate maintenance because her husband was no longer
providing for her.79
In addition to Anne’s complete removal from participation in the 2009
amendment and the disparity between her husband’s wealth and the amount
left to her by the 2009 amendment, the circuit court highlighted two other
factors as indicative of Ripley’s intent to deprive. First, the time between
execution of the 2009 amendment and Ripley’s death was short, less than
one year.80 Also, the circuit court found evidence of intent to keep Anne
uninformed regarding the 2009 amendment because she was given copies of
both the original trust and 2004 trust amendment, but she was not given a
copy of the 2009 amendment.81
b. The majority opinion
The Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected all four of the appellant’s arguments against including the trust in calculating the spousal elective share.
First, the court agreed with the appellant that Arkansas’s spousal elective statute limits a spousal election to property owned by a decedent at
death, but not as an absolute statement.82 The appellant asserted that the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 884–85.
Id., 434 S.W.3d at 884–85.
Id., 434 S.W.3d at 885.
Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880.
Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880.
Id., 434 S.W.3d at 880.
Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885.
Id., 434 S.W.3d at 885.
Id., 434 S.W.3d at 885.
Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 9, 434 S.W.3d at 882.
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elective share cannot include trust property because a trust settlor is divested
of ownership at death and to hold otherwise would be to invalidate the Arkansas Trust Code.83 The court responded by explaining that the appellant’s
first argument overlooks the finding of fraud.84 The lower court did not invalidate the trust for all purposes, but only for the limited purpose of including it in the calculation of the elective share.85 The court affirmed that the
issue was not whether the revocable trust became irrevocable upon Ripley’s
death; instead, the issue was whether the trust, despite its otherwise irrevocable character that manifested upon Ripley’s death, should be included in
the estate for the purpose of calculating the spousal elective share when a
court finds intent to deprive the spouse.86
The court remarked that “Arkansas law has long recognized the concept of fraud on the surviving spouse’s marital rights to property and an
elective share” and cited Hamilton to support the court’s historical favoring
of zealous protection of those rights even when they are contrary to a decedent’s intent.87 Thus, the court’s finding of an exception to the general rule
that Arkansas’ spousal elective statute limits a spousal election to property
owned by a decedent at death was “expressly linked” to a finding of fraudulent intent.88
Second, the court rejected the assertion that the evidence did not support a finding that Ripley intended to deprive Anne.89 In doing so, the court
agreed with the lower court’s reliance on Richards for the use of an intentbased test supplemented with some factors from Karsenty v. Schoukroun,90 a
Maryland decision on a similar case.91 The Maryland decision also supported the idea that there can be no fixed rule for determining intent; instead,
these cases “should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis considering all
relevant facts and circumstances.”92
After synthesizing applicable factors from the battery of cases cited in
Richards (Missouri, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois) and from Karsenty
(Maryland), the factors the court determined weighed in favor of fraud included the degree of deprivation (Ripley left Anne approximately 1.6% of
his total worth); the relationship between the spouses leading up to death;
the withdrawal of Anne’s participatory status as trustee; the time span be83. Id. at 6–7, 434 S.W.3d at 881.
84. Id. at 7, 434 S.W.3d at 881.
85. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 881.
86. Id. at 7–8, 434 S.W.3d at 881.
87. Id. at 10, 434 S.W.3d at 883 (citing Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 578, 879
S.W.2d 416, 419 (1994)).
88. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 7, 434 S.W.3d at 881.
89. Id. at 15, 434 S.W.3d at 885.
90. 959 A.2d 1147 (Md. 2008).
91. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884.
92. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 884 (citing Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1160).
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tween the last amendment and Ripley’s death (less than one year); and the
lack of notice given to Anne regarding her removal as a beneficiary.93 Notably, the high court felt that, in addition to the circuit court’s findings of fact,
fraudulent intent was evident on the face of the documents when considered
in whole.94
Third, the court disagreed with the appellant’s argument that Anne
should be required to prove the common law elements of fraud.95 In addition
to a lack of authority for the proposition, the court cited Maryland’s
Karsenty decision and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in noting that other courts have expressly rejected the application of common law fraud doctrine in the context of cases involving
fraud on marital rights.96
The last argument lost by the appellant was an alternative argument: if
the court did find fraudulent intent, then the 2009 trust amendment should
be invalidated entirely and the property should be distributed according to
the terms of the 2004 amendment.97 Because the Arkansas General Assembly has not adopted the concept of an augmented estate, judicially imposing
it would be inappropriate.98 In rebuttal, the court pointed out that although
the Richards court found fraudulent intent lacking, the decision carved out
the potential for a future court to invalidate an inter vivos trust if it found
that it amounted to a fraudulent scheme to defeat the spouse’s marital
rights.99 Furthermore, the court felt that invalidating the trust for the narrow
purpose of calculating the elective share was harmonious with the Arkansas
Trust Code and the Arkansas Probate Code and cited Illinois Supreme Court
common law stating that “merely because a trust is deemed void as to the
widow’s right does not necessarily make it void as to the rights of other
beneficiaries.”100
c. The dissent
In asserting that the court’s decision “rejects black-letter Arkansas probate law,” the two-member dissent essentially ignored the finding of fraud

93. Id. at 13–14, 434 S.W.3d at 884–85.
94. Id. at 15, 434 S.W.3d at 885.
95. Id. at 16, 434 S.W.3d at 886.
96. Id. at 17, 434 S.W.3d at 886 (stating that “‘fraud in the classic sense’ is not at issue
and a court should instead look for an ‘improper circumvention of marital rights of the surviving spouse’” (citing Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1173)).
97. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 18, 434 S.W.3d at 887.
98. Id., at 17–18, 434 S.W.3d at 887.
99. Id. at 18, 434 S.W.3d at 887.
100. Id. at 19, 434 S.W.3d at 887 (citing Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d
417, 419 (Ill. 1969)).
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and focused on the appellant’s first and fourth arguments.101 The dissent
cited the Arkansas elective share statute102 in opining that the elective share
is comprised of dower and dower rights extend only to the decedent’s estate.103
The dissent also cited Gregory in support of the idea that the right to an
elective share vests upon death but only in the probate estate of the decedent.104 Unlike the majority, the dissent insisted this is an absolute rule, subject to no exceptions. To believe thus, as the majority pointed out, ignores
West and Richards, which implicate intent as the appropriate consideration,
and ignores Dahlmann, Gregory, and Hamilton for the principle that the
“surviving spouse’s right to an elective share is inviolate.”105
The justices further argued that this new law will confuse the realm of
estate planning because under this new law “any transfer of personalty to a
person other than the spouse would compel the conclusion that the spouse
was defrauded by the transfer and deprived of her marital rights.”106 Although this articulation of the law ignores most of the majority’s analysis
regarding fraudulent circumstances, and the court’s holding was explicitly
limited to revocable inter vivos trusts, denying that Thompson will confuse
estate planning in Arkansas is difficult.
Indeed, tests based primarily on the intent of the transferor receive
much criticism on the ground that they call the validity of any transfer made
by a spouse into doubt.107 In an ominous foreshadowing of things to come,
the dissent lamented that “[t]he confusion to follow this opinion is indeed
disturbing.”108
III. ARGUMENT
“In cases of this type there can be no fixed rule of determining when a
transfer or gift is fraudulent to a wife; each case must be determined on its
own facts and circumstances.”109 Thompson’s holding is an explicitly narrow
101. Id. at 23, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). Justice Hart wrote the dissent,
which was joined by Justice Baker. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 889.
102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-39-401 (Repl. 2012).
103. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 20–21, 434 S.W.3d at 888–89 (Hart, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 20, 434 S.W.3d at 888.
105. See cases cited supra notes 54–63.
106. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting). The dissent further went on to speculate that this rule would permit the elective share to reach not
only trusts, but payable on death accounts, co-ownership registration with the right of survivorship, and insurance proceeds over which the decedent retained a general power of appointment. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 889.
107. Id. at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889; Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 248 (N.H. 1983).
108. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 22, 434 S.W.3d at 889 (Hart, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 12, 434 S.W.3d at 884 (majority opinion).
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one in that it applies only to revocable inter vivos trusts in the context of
fraudulent intent. The court relied on authority from four other courts in
expressly adopting a case-by-case approach, and every case cited in Thompson gives significant attention to intent.110 A closer look at Thompson and
these other decisions shows that a label of fraudulent intent is merely a posthoc justification for a decision based on what the court thinks is equitable.
The concept of fraudulent intent can be described as nebulous at best.
Numerous locutions are used throughout various courts in an effort to conceptually summarize what it is that will render a nonprobate transfer subject
to the reach of the elective share. While the Thompson court speaks constantly in terms of “the Decedent’s intent to deprive Appellee of her marital
rights,” the Maryland decision it relies upon heavily contradicts this language by stating that “a decedent’s intent to defraud her or his surviving
spouse is not the proper focus” and “the intent that matters is the decedent’s
intent to structure a transaction by which she or he parts with ownership of
the property in form, but not in substance.”111
Another decision relied upon by Thompson shows a similar discrepancy:
Intention and purpose are not necessarily the controlling factors in determining whether a transfer is fraudulent. One must take into consideration the effect of the transfer. In other words, if the properties transferred
prior to death are of such a quantity in relation to the total estate as the
widow is substantially deprived of that which she would otherwise take
under our statutes, then from such a transfer fraud may be presumed under certain conditions and circumstances. 112

Hence, fraudulent intent in the context of these cases has no definite
meaning; it is merely a statement of a result rather than a rationale for reaching the result.113 Consequently, courts that rely on intent as a critical point of
the analysis retain vast flexibility in upholding or invalidating a transfer that
diminishes the elective share because no single factor controls.114 The diffi-

110. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1170 (Md. 2008); Rose v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ill. 1969); In re Estate of Steck, 81 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Wis.
1957); Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 37 (Mo. 1955).
111. Compare Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885, with Karsenty, 959
A.2d at 1170.
112. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802–03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
113. See Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 (Ill. 1978) (“The use of
the phrase ‘intent to defraud’ is confusing and carries a connotation not relevant to the question to be resolved.”); Melvin J. Sykes, Inter Vivos Transfers in Violation of the Rights of
Surviving Spouses, 10 MD. L. REV. 1, 7 (1949).
114. Sykes, supra note 113, at 7.
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culty and variability in applying an intent-based test is undoubtedly why
some jurisdictions reject the use of such a standard.115
A.

Fraudulent Intent: An Exceedingly Malleable Analysis in the Context
of Spousal Disinheritance

As the Thompson court made clear, “‘fraud in the classic sense’ is not
at issue, and a court should instead look for an ‘improper circumvention of
marital rights of the surviving spouse.’”116 Although the Thompson court
focused on the degree of deprivation and the lack of notice in finding that
Ripley intended to deprive Anne of her elective share, it advocates using a
totality of the circumstances to determine whether fraudulent intent was
present. The following synthesis of factors from other jurisdictions relied
upon by the Thompson court identifies what other factors, both explicit and
implicit, often go into a determination of fraudulent intent.117 These factors
include the degree of control retained; the degree of deprivation; alternative
support; the relationship between the settlor and beneficiary; the nature of
the spousal relationship; the anticipation of death; the presence of consideration; and consent or waiver. These cases demonstrate that these factors are
very malleable, leading ultimately to unpredictable results.
1.

Control

Despite the Thompson court’s almost nonexistent attention to it, the
degree of control retained by the settlor over the nonprobate transfer is likely the most significant factor inherent to these analyses.118 The premise behind using control as a factor is that “a trust settlor should not be allowed to
retain all the benefits of ownership without assuming any of the burdens.”119
As important as the policy behind the spousal elective share is, the rival interest of free alienation must be balanced against it.120
115. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984) (stressing that its objective test requires no consideration of motive, intention, good faith, or whether the spouse
made an illusory, colorable, or fraudulent transfer).
116. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 17, 434 S.W.3d at 886 (citing Karsenty, 959 A.2d at
1173).
117. Id. at 11–12, 434 S.W.3d at 883–84. The focus of this note’s factors synthesis is on
Missouri, Tennessee, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Maryland because the Thompson court expressly relied on decisions from these five jurisdictions.
118. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1174; Roe, supra note 33, at 755.
119. Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2006).
120. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 317 Ark. 572, 578, 879 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1994) (“The elective share provisions are designed to strike a balance between a testator’s right to control the
distribution of his or her property for life, while preserving the State’s interest in protecting
the surviving spouse.”).
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Whether the settlor retained excessive control over the nonprobate
transfer invariably presents a threshold question, even if an implicit one.
Retention of control is so important some jurisdictions advocate a binary,
control-based test to the exclusion of other tests; in these jurisdictions, if the
settlor retains excessive control, the transfer is held invalid and subject to
the elective share.121 In other jurisdictions, the retention of control does not
automatically subject the nonprobate transfer to the elective share.122 These
jurisdictions are similar to the binary jurisdictions in that “[i]f no control is
retained, there can be no fraud,” but these jurisdictions differ from the binary jurisdictions because “[e]ven if control is retained, the transfer can be
technically valid,” in which case the court would apply a factors analysis to
determine whether the transferred assets are subject to the elective share.123
This is the category Thompson and the decisions it relies upon fall into.
How much control is excessive control? Though the question begs asking, it is difficult to answer because the degree of control that may be considered excessive varies within and between jurisdictions.124 That is, jurisdictions that allegedly use a binary, control-based test often consider other
factors in determining whether the settlor retained excessive control,125 and
121. See, e.g., Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 843 P.2d 240, 245 (Kan. 1992) (“[I]f . . . the [settlor] retains the power of revocation, it is fallacious, illusive and deceiving, and will be considered as fraud on the rights of the widow where she is deprived of her distributive share.”);
Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 574–75 (Mass. 1984) (stating that “the estate of a decedent . . . shall include the value of assets held in an inter vivos trust created by the deceased
spouse as to which the deceased spouse alone retained the power during his or her life to
direct the disposition of those trust assets for his or her benefit, as, for example, by the exercise of a power of appointment or by revocation of the trust”); Dreher v. Dreher, 634 S.E.2d
646, 650 (S.C. 2006) (concluding in regard to a revocable trust that the decedent “retained
substantial control because he ‘retained such extensive powers over the assets of the trust that
he ha[d] until [his] death the same rights in the assets after creation of the trust that he had
before its creation’”).
122. See Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1174; Knell v. Price, 550 A.2d 413, 416 (Md. 1988).
123. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1174 (stating that “other considerations must exist concurrently with retained control for a surviving spouse to invalidate the transfer”); see Johnson v. La
Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 192 (Ill. 1978); Methodist Episcopal Church of Emory
Chapel of Ellicotts Mills in Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Hadfield, 453 A.2d 145, 149 (Md. 1982);
Raymond C. O’Brien, Integrating Marital Property into a Spouse’s Elective Share, 59 CATH.
U.L. REV. 617, 650 (2010) (“Like Newman and subsequent decisions, the Maryland court
does not consider retention of control by the decedent nor intent to defraud as determinative
factors.”).
124. Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 249 (N.H. 1983); W.D. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE
WIDOW’S SHARE 93 (1960) (“Most courts, even in jurisdictions that purport to follow the
[control-based] doctrine, do not practice what they preach. . . . In other words, the courts,
consciously or otherwise, are influenced by factors other than mere retention of control. But
the courts already committed to the ‘control’ rationale naturally tend to announce the decision
in terms of the control factor. In many cases, violence has been done to the doctrine in order
to square the result with the doctrine.”); see Sykes, supra note 113, at 4–5.
125. MACDONALD, supra note 124, at 94–95.
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their holdings may apply so narrowly to a certain set of facts that the benefit
of an easy-to-apply, control-based test is obscured.126
While some jurisdictions do consider the power to revoke a trust to be
excessive control, most courts reject this as a dispositive factor.127 Instead,
the retention of absolute dominion and control by the decedent during life
generally does not give rise to per se fraud on marital rights; it simply means
the property will be subject to a court’s evaluation of the case on its equities.128
In addition to the degree of control technically retained, a related factor
courts often look to is the degree of control actually exercised and whether
the exercise of power was “unfettered.”129 In the case of a settlor who has
retained absolute control over a trust, the court might consider the accessibility that the settlor actually enjoys.130 For instance, funds in an individual
retirement account may be technically accessible, but the ease of access relative to a checking or savings account and the accompanying tax consequences of making a withdrawal may weigh in favor of less control retained
and more validity.131 Similarly, if the settlor retains the right to invade the
trust, a court may find it somewhat redemptive that the right was never actually exercised.132
As the name implies, trusts created as irrevocable trusts are generally
accompanied by a relinquishment of power. But, even in the context of an
irrevocable trust, the court may still find that the decedent retained substantial control if he was the beneficiary of the trust income for life.133 Also, if a
trust makes use of several different types of nonprobate transfers with varying levels of control retained by the settlor, the court will likely consider

126. Sullivan, 460 N.E.2d at 577–78 (stating “[w]hat we have announced as a rule for the
future hardly resolves all the problems that may arise” and suggesting that the rule would be
different if the power of appointment was held jointly with another person, if some or all of
the trust assets were conveyed by a third party, if the trust was made prior to marriage, or if
the trust contained insurance policies over which the decedent retained control).
127. See Hanke, 459 A.2d at 248–49; MACDONALD, supra note 124, at 91–92 (discussing
the potentially high cost of revocation and noting of a revocable trust that “complete ownership is at all times attainable by a stroke of [the grantor’s] own pen”).
128. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1159–63.
129. Id. at 1178.
130. Id. at 1175.
131. Id.
132. See Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978) (finding a
transfer valid because “[t]here [was] no evidence that Mrs. Johnson made any withdrawals
from the principal or otherwise exercised any of her reserved powers to deplete the trust
assets”).
133. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967) (invalidating an
irrevocable trust that provided the decedent would receive income for life).
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how much control is associated with the assets that comprise the majority of
the trust.134
Another standard asks whether the control retained was “of such a degree as to reduce the trustees to the status of agents.”135 This same case held
that a reservation of a power of appointment did not render the trust invalid.136 Other jurisdictions, however, disagree with this stance.137
Although the Thompson court did not acknowledge the degree of control Ripley retained over the trust in the most express of terms, it did consider control in several ways. Most importantly, its holding was expressly limited to revocable trusts, which signals that the court would not be bound by
its ruling in the context of a settlor that relinquishes substantially more control over nonprobate assets.138 Also, the court noted that the trust distributed
principal and income to Ripley for his lifetime, which shows that he actually
exercised the substantial control he retained.139
So, retaining control is necessary, not sufficient, to a finding of fraud.
A helpful heuristic in conceptualizing the effect of control in these cases is
that retaining control does not necessarily indicate an invalid or fraudulent
transfer, but relinquishing control entirely will likely indicate a valid or nonfraudulent transfer.140
2. Degree of Deprivation
“The degree to which an inter vivos transfer deprives a surviving
spouse of property that she or he would otherwise take as part of the decedent’s estate is also extremely significant.”141 Every jurisdiction cited in
Thompson turns largely on the degree of deprivation.142 In some contexts, it
134. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1175.
135. In re Estate of Steck, 81 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Wis. 1957).
136. Id. at 733–34.
137. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. 1984).
138. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 19, 434 S.W.3d 877, 887.
139. Id. at 21, 434 S.W.3d at 888.
140. See Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1173 (Md. 2008) (“[A]n inter vivos
transfer in which a decedent gives up all control of the transferred property may not be invalidated by a surviving spouse as an unlawful frustration of the spouse’s statutory share.”).
141. Id. at 1176; Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 369 S.W.2d 592, 600 (Mo. App. 1963) (“Running
through all the cases, whether by express statement or by implication, is the all-important
consideration of extent and proportion—that is, the proportion which the property transferred
in deprivation of the widow’s marital rights bears to the whole of the transferor’s assets.”).
142. See Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1176 (stating “[t]he degree to which an inter vivos transfer deprives a surviving spouse of property that she or he would otherwise take as part of the
decedent’s estate is also extremely significant”); Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 37 (Mo.
1955) (stating that net income for life in half of the trust corpus was not indicative of intent to
defraud spouse); Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967) (noting
that one factor used in subjecting the trust to the elective share was that “stocks placed in the
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may be the decisive factor.143 In other words, extreme deprivation may allow
fraudulent intent to be presumed, especially when the spouse is disinherited
completely.144
Although previous Arkansas case law has suggested that fraudulent intent must be proven and may never be presumed,145 the courts seem to be
comfortable with the notion that substantial deprivation, in and of itself,
gives rise to the presumption of fraudulent intent, especially when the
spouse is disinherited completely.146 In Thompson, the court seemed very
concerned by the $100,000 left to Anne of Ripley’s $6,000,000 estate, a
bequest of 1.6% that fell “woefully short” of providing for her and was akin
to leaving her “basically nothing.”147
Notably, the courts may be comfortable with a disinheritance of as
much as 40% in certain contexts.148 Despite the significance of this factor,
its wide-ranging parameters make it exceedingly difficult to evaluate and
summarize in isolation.
trust were a large proportion of the settlor’s personal property”); In re Estate of Steck, 81
N.W.2d 729, 734 (Wis. 1957) (stating that leaving the entire income from the assets of a
trust, almost $12,000 yearly, and the right to invade the corpus does not show an intention to
deprive spouse).
143. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1177.
144. See Sherrill, 417 S.W.2d at 802–03 (stating that “if the properties transferred prior to
death are of such a quantity in relation to the total estate as the widow is substantially deprived of that which she would otherwise take under our statutes, then from such a transfer
fraud may be presumed under certain conditions and circumstances”); Simpson v. Fowler,
No. W2011-02112-COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 3675321, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2012)
(applying Sherrill). In Sherrill, the decedent, who had an estate worth $478,256, left his
spouse $2,500 and a life estate in property valued at $196,000. Sherrill, 417 S.W.2d at 800–
02. Although Newman v. Dore was not cited by the Thompson court, it is a landmark case
and it supports the idea that significant deprivation that occurs without the surviving spouse’s
knowledge may give rise to the presumption of fraud as well. See Newman v. Dore, 9 N.E.2d
966, 968 (N.Y. 1937).
145. West v. West, 120 Ark. 500, 504, 179 S.W. 1017, 1018 (1915) (“Fraud is never
presumed, but must be proved, and the burden was on the defendant to show that the deed
had been made in fraud of her marital rights.”).
146. See Whittington v. Whittington, 106 A.2d 72, 78 (Md. 1954) (noting that the distinguishing factor between two past cases with similar facts but dissimilar outcomes was the
degree of deprivation). In one of the two cases, Mushaw v. Mushaw, in which the decedent
left his spouse nothing and created trusts totaling $36,000, the court acknowledged the same
in saying that “[t]he salient fact is that the widow is completely stripped of her marital rights
in the personal property of her husband. This may be a matter of degree, but it appears to be
the only basis on which the decisions can be reconciled.” Mushaw v. Mushaw, 39 A.2d 465,
467–68 (Md. 1944).
147. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 13, 434 S.W.3d 877, 884–85.
148. See Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1177; Whittington, 106 A.2d at 77 (explaining that the
decedent wanted to provide for his sons and did not deprive his wife entirely because, under
his arrangements, she would take one-third of his estate, although the trusts resulted in her
taking 40% less than she would have had they been invalidated).
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3. Alternative Support
The court may also analyze alternative support to determine whether
the disinheritance was reasonable under the circumstances. Within the context of support provided by the decedent, alternative support may include
both probate and nonprobate arrangements and inter vivos gifts left to the
surviving spouse by the decedent.149 If the court believes the decedent made
reasonable provisions for the surviving spouse through probate transfers,
nonprobate transfers, inter vivos gifts, or a combination thereof, it may
weigh against a finding of fraudulent intent.150 For example, in Maryland,
the Karsenty court considered a $200,000 life insurance policy that the surviving spouse benefitted from; her inheritance of a vehicle worth $22,000
and a thrift savings plan worth $12,000; and the fact that the decedent paid
off a $17,000 balance on the spouse’s car loan and paid her $1,200 in
monthly rent.151
Conversely, alternative means of support from the decedent that benefit
someone other than the surviving spouse may weigh in favor of fraudulent
intent. If, for example, the decedent has life insurance policies or bonds payable to beneficiaries other than the spouse in addition to a
trust that works in derogation of the spouse’s elective share, the court is
more likely to find that the decedent intended to disinherit the surviving
spouse.152
In addition to considering alternative means of support provided by the
decedent, the surviving spouse’s independent wealth may factor into the
analysis.153 The Karsenty court went so far as to consider the worth of the
surviving spouse’s own home, her income, and her pensions.154 As demonstrated by an Illinois case, a court may have a difficult time finding fraudulent intent when the surviving spouse has a net value in excess of
$2,000,000 because the court presumes that the decedent took the surviving
spouse’s wealth into consideration when making provisions for death.155 In
other words, you may intend to use nonprobate transfers to deprive your
spouse of his or her elective share as long as they are rich.156
149. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1177–78.
150. Id. at 1177; Simpson v. Fowler, No. W2013-02109-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 1601137,
at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2014).
151. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1178.
152. See Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967) (stating that
bonds and insurance policies totaling $11,500 payable to the decedent’s sister and niece were
evidence of intent to deprive).
153. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1165.
154. Id. at 1154.
155. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978).
156. See id.
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Interestingly, the Thompson court rejected the idea that alternative support weighed against a finding of fraud. The court acknowledged that Ripley
showered Anne with gifts of great value while he was alive,157 and Ripley’s
nephew, the appellant, argued that the gifts demonstrated Ripley’s intent to
provide for Anne by other means.158 Still, because the gifts were made to the
spouse prior to Ripley’s acts of disinheritance, the court said this factor did
not discount a finding of fraudulent intent.159 Because the gifts were not testamentary in nature, the Thompson court found considering them in lieu of
an elective share to be inappropriate.160 According to the Karsenty decision,
which Thompson relied upon, a court should consider inter vivos gifts that
the decedent gave to a surviving spouse.161 Whether the Thompson court
would embrace this particular facet of Karsenty under different factual circumstances is uncertain.
The Thompson court gave no attention to the independent wealth of
Anne.162 Although the facts disclose that Anne had left to sell some real estate she owned, this fact was mentioned only in passing and seemingly to
explain her absence from Ripley.163
4. The Relationship Between the Settlor and Intended Beneficiary
Generally speaking and all other factors constant, a nonprobate transfer
that works to the derogation of the elective share is more likely to be upheld
if the provisions are for the benefit of the decedent’s children; the courts
seem to be sympathetic to an intent to provide for one’s own children, especially if the surviving spouse is not left destitute. In Karsenty, the decedent’s
daughter was the beneficiary of the nonprobate assets that diminished the
elective share, and the court remanded the case so the trial court could consider this.164 In Whittington, a case in which the court allowed the surviving
spouse to suffer a 40% decrease in her share of the property imposed by a
nonprobate transfer, the decedent’s sons were the beneficiaries of the assets.165
157. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 13, 434 S.W.3d 877, 885.
158. Id. at 16, 434 S.W.3d at 886.
159. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 886.
160. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 886.
161. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1177 (Md. 2008) (“A scrutinizing court
also should consider as part of this factor inter vivos gifts that the decedent gave to the surviving spouse.”).
162. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 12–16, 434 S.W.3d at 884–86 (failing to discuss the
status of Anne Thompson’s independent wealth along with the factors used by the circuit
court or anywhere else in the opinion).
163. Id. at 4, 434 S.W.3d at 880.
164. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1179–80.
165. Whittington v. Whittington, 106 A.2d 72, 76 (Md. 1954).
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This concept may extend not only to children, but dependents generally. In Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, the court upheld a revocable trust
that benefited the decedent’s mother, who was financially dependent on the
decedent.166 However, Sherrill v. Mallicote, a case in which the court invalidated an irrevocable trust that benefited the decedent’s siblings, demonstrates that disinheriting transfers that benefit someone other than the decedent’s children or dependents are less likely to be valid.167 Notably, in
Thompson, Ripley had no children or dependents.168
Although naming one’s children as the beneficiaries of a nonprobate
transfer that diminishes the elective share may mitigate a finding of fraudulent intent to some degree, ensuring that the degree of spousal deprivation is
not egregious is likely more important.169 For example, in White v. Sargent,
the trust’s stated purpose was to provide for the long-term care and education of the decedent’s children; however, the court found fraudulent intent
because the creation of the trust left the surviving spouse with “essentially
no means of support.”170 Furthermore, if the court feels that the surviving
spouse is adequately provided for, it may even uphold a transfer when the
beneficiaries are friends or charity groups.171
Another aspect of the relationship between the settlor and beneficiary
that the court may analyze is the intent of the transferee.172 If, for example, a
transferee received property under a mutual agreement that the transferor
would remain the practical owner, such a sham transfer would weigh in favor of invalidation.173
5. The Nature of the Spousal Relationship
The nature of the spousal relationship is likely to get some attention
whether the factor is explicitly listed in the court’s traditional factors test or
implicitly considered as one of many factors inherent to analyzing intent.

166. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195, 197 (Ill. 1978).
167. See Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 803–04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
168. Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879.
169. See White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 668 (D.C. 2005); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 253 N.E.2d 417, 420 (Ill. 1969) (remanding a case in which the decedent demonstrated
an intent to leave the bulk of his estate (60%) to his children in order to determine what portion of the decedent’s total property was available to the surviving spouse).
170. Sargent, 875 A.2d at 666.
171. See Windsor v. Leonard, 475 F.2d 932, 933–34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the
surviving spouse was left with a 50% share in an estate exceeding $100,000 in addition to his
personal holdings worth some $140,000).
172. See Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1175–76 (Md. 2008); Sykes, supra
note 113, at 15.
173. Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1176.
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Tennessee, for example, includes the factor explicitly as part of its factors analysis.174 In deciding to invalidate the transfer, the Sherrill court noted
that the decedent feared his wife wanted a divorce as demonstrated by his
consistently asking her over the two years leading up to his death whether
she was going to file for divorce.175 And, in Johnson, the court mentioned
that the spouses had “a warm and loving marriage” in upholding the transfer.176 Although a court may not include the factor explicitly in its battery of
factors, it is a factor that will likely influence the court to some degree; it
may weigh strongly or barely be recognized depending on the facts of the
case.177 In Sargent, the spouses were separated and seeking a second divorce
when the trust was created.178 The decedent had a history of lying about his
finances to escape paying child support and alimony, and the court used this
as a factor weighing in favor of fraudulent intent.179
Whether the surviving spouse abandoned the decedent is an important
consideration.180 A finding of fraudulent intent may not pose such an unforgiving standard where a deed is made for the purpose of defeating the marital rights of a deserter spouse even though the predeceasing spouse retains
practical ownership during life and relinquishes control entirely.181 A Missouri statute bolsters the idea that one cannot abandon a spouse without
cause and expect to receive an elective share,182 so this issue is obviously
implicated, but this question would invite finger-pointing and a troublesome
parsing of facts.
Even though the Maryland court in Karsenty did not include the nature
of the spousal relationship as part of its factors test explicitly, it did indicate
that the trial court should consider whether and to what extent the surviving
spouse had cared for the decedent during his final illness.183
The Thompson court gave extensive consideration to Anne and Ripley’s spousal relationship in its determination of fraudulent intent. The court
found that Ripley’s intent to deprive Anne “manifested sometime in 2008
when his health had begun to deteriorate and the parties were no longer liv174. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802–03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
175. Id. at 802.
176. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978).
177. See Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 36–37 (Mo. 1955) (stating in its final conclusion that “[t]he voluminous record reveals convincing evidence of Mr. Potter’s affection and
provident consideration for plaintiff” and distinguishing these findings with those from a case
in which the decedent was “obsessed” with ensuring his spouse would not receive any more
than $200 per month, the sum she earned prior to their marriage).
178. White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C. 2005).
179. Id. at 665.
180. Sykes, supra note 113, at 14.
181. See Whitehill v. Thiess, 158 A. 347, 347–48 (Md. 1932).
182. See MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 474.140 (1955).
183. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1180 (Md. 2008).
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ing together.”184 Over the course of their relationship, the spouses grew distant. Where once Ripley lavished his wife with gifts and promised to care
for her needs, she eventually felt compelled to file for separate maintenance.185 Instead of using gifts to find alternative support, which would
weigh in favor of a valid transfer, the court actually used the gifts Ripley
gave his wife to characterize the later years of their relationship as relatively
affectionless, which weighs in favor of fraudulent intent.
The court is also more likely to find fraudulent intent when a spouse
accrues no assets of his or her own due to raising children and homemaking.186 As Thompson demonstrates, a spouse who operates as a homemaker
may compel a court toward a finding of fraudulent intent, even in the absence of children, and especially if the spouse stopped working at the decedent’s request because the decedent promised to provide for the spouse.187
6. Anticipation of Death
Whether the decedent made the transfer at issue in anticipation of death
is commonly considered in a court’s determination of fraudulent intent;188
however, this factor is largely superficial as it is easily manipulated and
outweighed by other factors. Generally, the less time between a decedent’s
disinheriting acts and death, the more suspect his or her intent.189 The court
may also look at the decedent’s knowledge as to his or her own state of
health.190
It is not uncommon for courts to simply ignore time spans that weigh
against a finding of fraudulent intent. In Sargent, the court said although
“twenty-nine months is more than ample time in which to transfer assets to a
trust and to do so in good faith, other factors prevent the court from holding
that this transfer was in good faith.”191 In Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
184. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d 877, 885.
185. Id. at 2, 13, 434 S.W.3d at 879, 885.
186. See White v. Sargent, 875 A.2d 658, 667 (D.C. 2005) (“The trial court did not err in
so finding, particularly in light of the fact that Mrs. Sargent stayed home to care for the children at her husband’s insistence and therefore accrued no assets of her own.”).
187. See Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 2, 434 S.W.3d at 879.
188. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885; White, 875 A.2d at 666; Johnson v. La Grange State
Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ill. 1978); Rose v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 253 N.E.2d 417,
419 (Ill. 1969); Karsenty, 959 A.2d at 1164; Sherrill v. Mallicote, 417 S.W.2d 798, 802
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1967); In re Estate of Steck, 81 N.W.2d 729, 734 (Wis. 1957). The Thompson court, as well as every opinion cited by the Thompson court, considered the decedent’s
anticipation of death.
189. See White, 875 A.2d at 666 (referring to this factor as whether or not there is a
“brink of death” transfer).
190. Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 35–36 (Mo. 1955).
191. White, 875 A.2d at 666 (focusing on the decedent’s knowledge of his poor health
established by a previous medical malpractice complaint filed by the decedent in which he
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although the settlor died five years after the creation of the trust that diminished the elective share, the court remanded the case so the trial court could
determine other facts, especially the degree to which the surviving spouse
was deprived.192
Similarly, courts may ignore suspiciously short time spans that would
otherwise weigh in favor of fraudulent intent. The Johnson court upheld a
trust even though it was made only seven months prior to the settlor’s
death.193 In Karsenty, the decedent died less than four months after creating
the trust at issue, and the court acknowledged that the decedent knew he was
very sick.194 The Karsenty court went so far as to use the decedent’s anticipation of death to affirmatively bolster its argument against a finding of
fraudulent intent; the court used the factor to support the idea that the decedent was getting his financial affairs in order to “cover everybody.” 195 Similarly, in Potter v. Winter, the decedent created the trust just three months
before death, and the court acknowledged that the decedent knew he would
not live long.196 Nonetheless, the court did not find fraudulent intent and
upheld the trust because it made sense that he “would wish to put his affairs
in order.”197
Although the Thompson court could just as easily have used Ripley’s
anticipation of death to show his intent to “put his affairs in order,” the court
instead cited Ripley’s failing health and the short time span between Ripley’s disinheriting acts and his death as evidence of fraudulent intent.198 But,
in Windsor v. Leonard, a District of Columbia court found that eighteen
months was “hardly the kind of ‘brink of death’ transfer that might indicate
bad faith on the part of the transferor,”199 most likely because the court felt
none of the other factors weighed in favor of fraudulent intent.
The only conclusion that follows from the courts’ treatment of the anticipation-of-death analyses is that the factor is somewhat vestigial and relatively unimportant; the courts address it as a matter of tradition, but the

stated that after suffering a heart attack and two strokes, he was aware that his “current heart
failure and disability . . . [was] irreversible, and [he was] now subjected to sudden death”).
192. Rose, 253 N.E.2d at 420.
193. Johnson, 383 N.E.2d at 197.
194. Karsenty v. Schoukroun, 959 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Md. 2008). The decedent made the
trust on June 23, 2004, while undergoing chemotherapy, radiation treatment, and a stem cell
transplant and died on October 18, 2004. Id.
195. Id. at 1155.
196. Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27, 35–36 (Mo. 1955).
197. Id. at 37.
198. See In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 2, 14, 434 S.W.3d 877, 879, 885.
Ripley amended the trust to disinherit Anne on May 29, 2009, and died on February 20,
2010, so the time span was about nine months. Id., 434 S.W.3d at 879, 885.
199. Windsor v. Leonard, 475 F.2d 932, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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court will either bend the analysis so that it supports the weight of the evidence or dismiss the factor as relatively unimportant.
7. Consideration
Several of the jurisdictions cited in Thompson consider whether or not
the transfer at issue was made in exchange for valuable consideration.200 In
Missouri, courts seem to find an absence of consideration to be a necessary
element in addition to fraudulent intent.201 The exchange of valuable consideration weighs highly in favor of a valid and complete transfer. Most of the
jurisdictions cited in Thompson also stand by the belief that a settlor has the
right to alienate his or her own property, even if doing so diminishes the
elective share, as long as the settlor gives up all control. Notably, cases of
nonprobate transfers that disinherit a spouse and make it to court are not
those in which significant consideration has been exchanged.
8. Consent or Waiver
Generally, when the decedent has made the transfer at issue surreptitiously, the factors weigh in favor of fraudulent intent, and, when the court
finds knowledge or consent by the surviving spouse, the factors weigh in
favor of a valid transfer. Although consent can manifest in an express form,
such as a prenuptial agreement, the consent required to determine that a
transfer was not surreptitious need not be express; in some cases, courts
highlight the factors that weigh in favor of implied consent or constructive
knowledge.
a. Implied consent
A Missouri case demonstrates that, where a spouse has signed trust
documents agreeing to serve as trustee should the settlor become incapacitated, consent and approval has been granted.202 Similarly, an Illinois court
asserted that a finding of fraudulent intent must fail where a surviving

200. See Methodist Episcopal Church of Emory Chapel v. Hadfield, 453 A.2d 145, 147
(Md. 1982); Potter, 280 S.W.2d at 35; Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 369 S.W.2d 592, 600 (Mo. App.
1963); Simpson v. Fowler, No. W2013-02109-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 1601137, at *3 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2014).
201. Potter, 280 S.W.2d at 35 (stating that the general rule in Missouri is that “a conveyance of property by the husband without consideration and with the intent and purpose to
defeat his widow’s marital rights in his property, is a fraud upon such widow and she may
sue in her own right, and set aside such fraudulent conveyance, and recover the property so
fraudulently transferred, to the extent of her interest therein”); Edgar, 369 S.W.2d at 600.
202. Potter, 280 S.W.2d at 36.
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spouse knew that the decedent had been meeting with an attorney to prepare
a trust and chose not to get involved.203
Even when substantial control is relinquished, disinheritance in the absence of consent or knowledge is frowned upon. In Sherrill, the irrevocable
trust that ultimately left the surviving spouse with no support was held invalid and, unsurprisingly, was created without the spouse’s knowledge.204
The facts in Thompson also led the court to find a lack of consent; the
court cited the fact that Anne had always been a co-trustee to the trust until
the last amendment was made, which disinherited her.205 Additionally, she
was not given a copy to inform her of the trust amendments as she had been
in the past.206
b. Express consent
Couples possessing the requisite legal capacity can contract around
property rights that would otherwise arise by operation of law upon marriage.207 These agreements commonly take the form of prenuptial and postnuptial agreements.
A prenuptial agreement is a contract made between prospective spouses in contemplation of marriage in which they define their property rights
and regulate the enjoyment and devolution of their real and personal estates.208 Prenuptial agreements are presumptively valid and favored by the
law as long as they are not contrary to public policy. 209 Prenuptial agreements involving fraud, however, are contrary to public policy, and, where
the intent of the parties is not clear on the face of the agreement, a court will
look to the circumstances surrounding its execution to determine intent and
validity in a manner that very much resembles a Thompson standard.210
B.

Combatting Uncertainty After Thompson: Arkansas Nuptial Agreements Can Enhance Predictability

A prenuptial agreement executed upon consideration of marriage must
be fair, equitable, and reasonable in view of a totality of the surrounding
facts and circumstances.211 With a standard that so closely mirrors that of
203. Johnson v. La Grange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 185, 195 (Ill. 1978).
204. Sherrill v. Mallicote, 248, 417 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1967).
205. In re Estate of Thompson, 2014 Ark. 237, at 14, 434 S.W.3d 877, 885.
206. Id. at 14, 434 S.W.3d at 885.
207. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Waiver of Spousal Rights in Estate of Deceased
Spouse § 2 (1975).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id.
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Thompson, how much protection can a nuptial agreement actually provide
against the uncertainty handed down by Thompson?
Although a nuptial agreement is not necessarily a fail-safe method of
gaining certainty and protection in estate planning post-Thompson, it can
afford a significant degree of protection. Despite the importance the court
gives to the degree of deprivation in cases like Thompson, a court will likely
uphold a voluntary waiver of spousal rights, even where the degree of
deprivation is great, if the surviving spouse is found to clearly and unequivocally waive his or her rights upon being fully informed and advised of the
spouse’s actual worth.212
Arkansas has enacted the Arkansas Premarital Agreement Act
(APAA).213 According to the law, a premarital agreement must be in writing
and be signed and acknowledged by both parties.214 Parties may agree to the
elimination or modification of spousal support or any other right not in violation of public policy and, specifically, not in derogation of the rights of a
child entitled to support.215 The APAA took effect on July 20, 1987, and it
applies to any prenuptial agreement occurring on or after that date.216
The APAA further provides that a prenuptial agreement is not enforceable if it was not executed voluntarily or if it was unconscionable when executed.217 Here, unconscionability means that a party was not provided a fair
and reasonable disclosure of the tentative spouse’s property; did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing and after consulting with legal counsel, any right to disclosure of the tentative spouse’s property beyond that
provided; and did not, or reasonably could not, have adequate knowledge of
the tentative spouse’s property.218
Notably, the protection given by a nuptial agreement is tempered by
providing that if the agreement causes a party to be eligible for public support, a court may order the other party to provide support despite the agreement’s terms to the contrary.219
In Arkansas, provisions in a prenuptial agreement that are disproportionate to the financial worth of an intended spouse give rise to a presumption of designed concealment.220 It then becomes the burden of the party
seeking enforcement of the prenuptial to prove that the party seeking rescis212. 7 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Waiver of Spousal Rights in Estate of Deceased
Spouse § 7.
213. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-401 to -413 (Repl. 2009).
214. Id. § 9-11-402 (Repl. 2009).
215. Id. § 9-11-403 (Repl. 2009).
216. Id. § 9-11-412 (Repl. 2009).
217. Id. § 9-11-406 (Repl. 2009).
218. Id.
219. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-406(b)(1) (Repl. 2009).
220. Faver v. Faver, 266 Ark. 262, 270, 583 S.W.2d 44, 48 (1979).
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sion had full knowledge of all information affecting the agreement.221 If the
party seeking enforcement of the prenuptial can meet the burden of proving
that the party seeking rescission had full disclosure, the court will uphold the
agreement.222 Even where a spouse is rushed into signing a prenuptial
agreement that he or she did not read an hour prior to being wed, the agreement will be binding where full disclosure of assets is attached and an attorney is provided.223
A postnuptial agreement is entered into during marriage to define each
spouse’s property rights in the event of death or divorce.224 Although many
states apply the same rules regulating both prenuptial and postnuptial
agreements, more states impose different standards for finding postnuptial
agreements valid, and Arkansas is one such state.225
In Arkansas, a postnuptial agreement is analyzed under contract law;
marriage is adequate consideration for a prenuptial agreement or an amendment to a prenuptial agreement that occurs after marriage, but it is not adequate consideration for a purely postnuptial agreement—for a purely postnuptial agreement, past consideration in the form of marriage is no consideration at all.226 Furthermore, under contract law, parties need not be advised
of their rights to make a postnuptial agreement valid.227
So, a prenuptial may be easier to enforce in some ways because, if you
meet the express provisions of the APAA relating to disclosure, legal counsel, and knowledge, the court should uphold the agreement. But, a postnuptial agreement may be easier to enforce in that it does not require legal
counseling. Also, because marriage is not adequate consideration for a post-

221. Id., 583 S.W.2d at 48.
222. Lee v. Lee, 35 Ark. App. 192, 196, 816 S.W.2d 625, 628 (1991).
223. Id., 816 S.W.2d at 628.
224. Simmons v. Simmons, 98 Ark. App. 12, 15, 249 S.W.3d 843, 846 (2007).
225. See id. at 15–16, 249 S.W.3d at 846–47 (holding that elements of a contract must be
satisfied in order to find a valid postnuptial agreement and, unlike prenuptial agreements,
marriage is not sufficient consideration to support a postnuptial agreement); Sean Hannon
Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 839, 881 (2007).
226. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-405 (Repl. 2009) (“After marriage, a premarital agreement
may be amended or revoked only by a written agreement signed by the parties. The amended
agreement or the revocation is enforceable without consideration.”); Simmons, 98 Ark. App.
at 15–16, 249 S.W.3d at 846–47 (upholding a postnuptial agreement because twenty-five
years of marriage does not constitute consideration).
227. Stewart v. Combs, 368 Ark. 121, 123, 128, 243 S.W.3d 294, 296, 300 (2006) (upholding a postnuptial agreement where the wife had neither been advised by an attorney nor
been advised of her right to an attorney because it satisfied the essential elements of a contract: competent parties, subject matter, legal consideration, mutual agreement, and mutual
obligations). Although the legal consideration was not equal because the wife was giving up
her right to continue living in the marital home in the event of her husband predeceasing her,
consideration need not be equal under contract law. Id. at 127, 243 S.W.3d at 299.
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nuptial, whether there was adequate consideration becomes a relevant issue
in a postnuptial where it would not in the context of a prenuptial.
It is also important to note that releasing one’s rights to dower or
curtesy via contract will not suffice as a release of one’s rights to an elective
share.228 Although the spousal elective share is comprised of dower or
curtesy, to release one’s rights to an elective share, the language of the contract must manifest a clear and specific intent to do so.229
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the probate system values “ease of administration and predictability of result,”230 cases like Thompson, which implement an unpredictable factors test turning on fraudulent intent, make estate planning very
difficult.231 This article’s synthesis of factors from jurisdictions relied on by
the Thompson court can shed significant insight as to how a court may interpret factual circumstances. Still, in order to create as strong an estate plan as
possible, estate planners going forward must err on the side of caution and
assume that Thompson’s holding will be extended to any nonprobate transfer where the decedent retains control during life.
Another way to mitigate the unpredictable rule imposed by Thompson
is to herald the importance of nuptial agreements like never before. Although the enforcement of a nuptial agreement must be fair, equitable, and
reasonable under the circumstances, Arkansas courts are willing to enforce
them when the APAA’s statutory requirements are satisfied. Admittedly,
nuptial agreements may be off-putting because they are unromantic, but, in
the wake of Thompson and during a time when divorce and remarriage is
increasingly common, the incentive for considering a nuptial agreement as
an effective means of risk management is certainly inflated. Accordingly,
practitioners need to make clients aware that, until Arkansas issues badly
needed legislation standardizing the law in this area,232 nuptial agreements
228. See Masterson v. Masterson, 200 Ark. 193, 198, 139 S.W.2d 30, 32 (1940) (“It will
be observed that the contract was made in lieu of any right of homestead and dower in the
lands then owned by Masterson, and he did not acquire any other lands. But the contract did
not require Mrs. Masterson to waive her statutory allowances, which are not dower but are in
addition to dower.”).
229. See id., 139 S.W.2d at 32.
230. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 683, 725 (1992).
231. See O’Brien, supra note 123, at 714; Roe, supra note 33, at 756; Vallario, supra note
30, at 535 (explaining that “common law modifications to the Traditional Elective Share
statutes . . . make estate planning very difficult”).
232. Creating this type of standardizing legislation or evaluating the provisions of the
UPC is no small task, and a discussion of what such law should look like is outside the scope
of this article. Of interest, however, is the fact that the Arkansas Bar Association requested
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may be one of a very short list of options that allow predictable management
of the devolution of nonprobate transfers.
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